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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to explain why although Spain has now a consolidated 
democratic regime it is still weakly and ambiguously promoting democracy or 
even good-governance abroad. Recent events such as international terrorism 
has made even more urgent to concentrate on democratic assistance in 
Maghreb neighbouring countries. The concept of governance despite its 
shortcomings might offer an opportunity for non-intrusive democratic 
promotion. However, as the case of Algeria shows in the last 3 years and 
before, Spanish foreign policy and development cooperation actors are 
manifestly reluctant to engage in such a course of action. Obvious dependence 
on energy supply (hydrocarbons) is challenged as the main reason for this. 
Alternatively, it is suggested that long practices in Spanish «Arab» foreign 
policy, unreformed foreign service, Europeanization of Spain's foreign policy 
and the «second to France player syndrome» best account for Spain's 
ambiguity with governance and its slow abandon of status quo policies. 
 
 
Este artículo intenta explicar por qué España que es ahora un régimen 
democrático consolidado vacila en promover la democracia y el buen gobierno 
en el extranjero y cuando lo hace lo hace de forma contradictoria. Los 
acontecimientos recientes como el terrorismo internacional sufrido en su 
propio suelo han hecho más urgente todavía la necesidad de concentrarse en la 
asistencia democrática en el Magreb. Por otra parte, el concepto de gobernanza, 
a pesar de sus claras limitaciones podría ofrecer un oportunidad para una 
promoción democrática no intrusiva o respetuosa de los países a los que va 
dirigida. Sin embargo, como el caso de Argela ilustra en los últimos tres años y 
antes incluso, la política exterior y de cooperación española y sus actores se 
han mostrado manifiestamente reticentes a comprometerse en un curso de 
acción favorecedor de la democracia o el buen gobierno. A veces, en contra de 
lo manifestado públicamente. La obvia dependencia en el abastecimiento de 
energía es desafiada abiertamente como la causa principal de este anómalo 
comportamiento. En su lugar, se sugiere que otras prácticas largamente 
arraigadas en la política exterior “árabe” de España, un servicio exterior carente 
de reforma, la europeización de nuestra acción exterior y el síndrome “de 
segundo jugador detrás de Francia” explican mejor tanto la ambigüedad y 
tibieza con la promoción del buen gobierno, como el lento abandono de las 
políticas de “statu quo”. 
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1. Preliminary reflection on foreign policy and international relations 
theory 
 
Foreign policy is designed on national interests. National Interests are a 
construction, not an objective reality. This construction is a dynamic and 
changing process of negotiation between social groups in ruling coalitions, 
state agencies and non-state actors with their particular background, 
international power constellations and normative international frameworks. 
This explains change in foreign policy but also inconsistencies and slow 
adaptations. 
One of the concepts that have recently emerged as a normative idea in 
international politics is governance. Governance refers to good management 
in both politics and economics affairs. Despite being born in powerful 
business sectors (corporate governance) and being adopted by the financial 
institutions like the World Bank, it is argued here that governance remains a 
fluid and malleable term which states, organisations and social actors are 
trying to shape and fill of content. In this sense, governance offers an 
opportunity for any country to both exert an influence on the international 
real in defining the normative agenda of governance and to deploy less 
intrusive mechanisms of political reform than those implied in democratic 
change. 
Governance therefore means something different than democracy. It is an 
idea that comprises political and economic sector and is based on self-
regulation rather than state oriented action and values. The values if present 
are those that permit society to deliver goods efficiently and according to the 
rules of the market. 
Governance promotion is also a more diffuse idea than democracy 
assistance, so when we refer to both it is to imply that the former requires 
lesser compromise and involvement. Governance promotion covers sectors 
such as accountability (through elections, separation of power, independent 
media), rule of law, effectiveness, and control of corruption and market-
friendly regulations. Whereas democracy assistance normally deals with 
elections, parliaments, political actors and civil society as the main core of 
preoccupation.  
  
 
2. The Spanish paradox 
 
Why Spain, a consolidated democracy integrated into a larger democratic 
European space and Western sphere of influence, is so weakly and hesitating 
promoting democracy or even governance abroad? Once the Cold War was 
finished, European nations like France, Britain committed themselves to 
closely link foreign action to democratic goals (La Baule Declaration, for 
instance, 1991). During the 1990s political instability in the Maghreb and 
especially the bombings in Casablanca and Madrid have prompted Spain to 
react and abandon traditional «status quo» policies in the Maghreb region. 
Gradually, Spanish leaders and population became aware of the urgency not 
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only of socio-economic development but also of political reform in its 
southern neighbours. It was not the demographic time-bomb but rather the 
political equation which exploded. 
Despite the realization of more complex links behind political radicalism 
than simple economic development, Spain has only very recently engaged in 
some sort of modest and indirect democratic promotion in the Maghreb. In 
Morocco this is slightly more advanced than in Algeria for diverse reasons. 
One could argue that is the especially complicate and delicate set of hispano-
moroccan relations which impedes assertive democracy promotion in 
Morocco, latest terrorism aggravating the situation. If this is to be admitted, 
why should democracy activities even be more retarded and timid in Algeria, 
where historical and current rapports are far less powerful than in Morocco? 
The obvious reasons may be hydrocarbons, gas and petrol, coming from 
Algeria into Spain. But accepting the importance of this factor, one cannot be 
fully satisfied with such an explanation. Why? There is a flagrant case in 
point, Tunisia. A net importer of hydrocarbons is hardly ever criticized on its 
poor democratic or governance record (on the contrary, remember Zapatero 
applauding speech on his September 2004 visit). Neither is better Spain's 
democratic assistance in Tunisia than it is in Algeria. A better reason must be 
found to account for Spain's general low profile of democratic promotion in 
the Maghreb, incontestably lower than in other regions, for example, Latin 
America. 
  
 
3. The Algeria case 
SPANISH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS IN CONTEXT 
 
Spain's relations with Algeria were never easy in the past, due to a 
great extent to the peculiar nature of the Algerian regime and until 1975 to 
the authoritarian government in Spain. Democratic Spain had to deal with 
two difficult subjects in the 1980s, the gas problem and the Western Sahara 
issue. Negotiations and gestes were always slow and full of 
misunderstandings. Despite common socialist views, Algeria hosted Spanish 
Terrorists of E.T.A until the late 1980s, after the failure of Algiers 
conversations between Madrid and the Basque armed organisation. 
Unlike Morocco, which always received much attention and where 
Spain had diverse interests forcing Madrid to reflect and design strategies, 
Algeria was normally left to France and never really seriously analyzed. It 
was considered a too complicated country for little non diversified interests. 
This partially explains Spain's confusion with the Algerian «spring» between 
1989 and 1992 and later with the civil conflict. And also why Spain normally 
preferred to give precedent to France's analysis and decisions. 
Miguel Larramendi and Bernabé Lopez have defined Spanish relations 
with Algeria as basically dominated by cautiousness. I think this may even 
fall a bit short of reality. They recall how in late 1991 Spanish officials from 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry –including General Director for North Africa—
Jorge Dezcallar contacted Abbasi Madani, leader of the FIS to ensure that 
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Spanish interests (mainly gas) would not be affected in the event of an 
Islamist government being formed (Larramendi and Lopez Garcia, 2002 : 
178). Later on, when the conflict became acute and no end could be foreseen, 
Spain tended to shield behind European Union's positions, in order to protect 
its own interests (ibid.). However, at the time that meant aligning with France, 
since the European Union could easily be oriented by France to issue 
statements or blocked to avoid interference or internationalisation of the 
conflict. In fact, Spanish declarations switched from time to time from calls 
to negotiations with all parts to applaud regime's initiatives. The most 
important facts were perhaps that Spanish kings inaugurated the Euro-
maghreb gasoduct in 1994, at the peak of internal violence, and that the 
Spanish Consulate and Instituto Cervantes never closed during the years of 
highest violence (Feliú, 2005: 5). By not closing its diplomatic service, Spain 
payed diplomatic services for other States (Larramendi and López, 2002: 171) 
and was very much appreciated by Algerian authorities. 
In recent years, with the new government of the Partido Popular, Spain 
launched an «exemplary strategic association» with Algeria. This was actually 
done in 2002 as a reaction to the hispano-moroccan crisis, but reflected a 
very good understanding between both government started in 2000, when 
Jose Maria Aznar was the first European leader to visit Buteflika after the 
uncontested presidential elections. That year different projects for a Treaty 
of Friendship and good neighbourhood, the second gasoduct, the conversion 
of debt into investments were outlined but only concluded in 2002, when the 
crisis with Morocco erupted. 
With the second socialist government in power, in mars 2004, relations 
with Algeria quickly worsened despite official rhetoric of good 
understanding. In many respects, Zapatero resumed the orientation of Aznar 
especially towards economic affairs but distanced himself from PP leader as 
regards to the Western Sahara issue. This issue became a latent source of 
conflict between the two States despite bilateral meetings of high level and 
cultural events such as the Ibn Jaldun Seminar. Low democratic assistance 
did however not change much from one government to the other. Why? 
  
 
THREE MORE THAN HESITATING EPISODES 
1st EPISODE. 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.  
Uncritically accepting the results and consequences. France's shadow in 
2004 Elections. 
 
The 1999 Presidential elections had been cooly received by both France 
and the US, specially the circumstances of the 6 candidates' withdrawal from 
competition days before the poll. For France it was an opportunity to make 
clear its initial disgust for the election of former Huari Bumedian's foreign 
ministry as President of Algeria. Buteflika's nationalist credentials did in fact 
not please Paris. Spain's Prime Minister Jose María Aznar was the first 
European leader to travel to Algiers and congratulate President Buteflika 
(Feliu, 2005). However between 1999 and 2004, both countries dramatically 
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changed their perceptions of Abdelaziz Buteflika. From 2001 on, a 
surprisingly strong rapprochement between Algiers and Washington took 
place. Algeria quickly became a partner for Washington in the war against 
terrorism and claimed to have been a pioneer in fighting terrorism at home. 
Although the 2004 Presidential elections offered uncontested results 
similar to previous elections, the reaction of Paris and Washington was 
clearly different, this time very positive. Within hours after the election, The 
USA President sent a letter of congratulation to the winning candidate. 
French President Chirac, wary of the USA relative gain of influence in the 
Maghreb, rushed into Algiers, even before the official results were 
announced, to endorse Buteflika's victory. Franco-Algerian relations were 
living an splendid time since the Algiers Declaration of 2003 and the 
announce of a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood. Paris did 
obviously not want this to pass or fade in the face of US and NATO-Algerian 
strengthening rapports. 
The European Union and Spain obviously followed these countries 
welcoming declarations. In fact, the EU, that did not issue a declaration and 
has interrupted negotiations with Algiers since 1997, did proceed with the re-
opening of its office in Algiers in 2000 and resumed negotiations to conclude 
the EM association agreement in 2002. After the elections, the EU showed its 
willingness to pursue negotiations and implement the agreement. Meanwhile, 
Spain's foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, payed a visit to Algiers 
right after the elections, on the 3rd May 2004. The acceptance of results 
despite alarming signs of pre-campaign manipulation, opened a new period 
under which foreign international consensus was formed around the support 
for Algerian reforms and its mentor, President Buteflika. 
In doing so, in accepting Buteflika's overwhelming victory and not 
challenging authoritarian practices against opposition candidate Ali Benflis, 
private press or abusive use of State resources, international actors paved 
the way to a comfortable exercise of power during Buteflika's second 
presidency including granting a general amnesty. By recognising legitimacy 
and authority of Buteflika's re-election and political program, main Algerian 
partners reduce their own capacity to criticize or oppose human rights 
violations or political backlash. 
 
 
2nd EPISODE: THE FAMILY CODE REFORM. Enough or too little? 
 
Algeria's family code of 1984 is the most reactionary legislation in the 
central Maghrebean countries. The example of Tunisia's continuous reforms 
and especially of Morocco's recent adaptation of Mudawana put more 
pressure on Algeria to adapt it. The United Nations has also insisted that 
Algeria lifted main regressive points of the Code and minimize the 
reservations made to the International Convention for the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Many Algerian women associations 
and human rights had long demanded a total abrogation of this code or a 
total remake. 
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President Buteflika charged a commission to study and propose a 
reform of the Family Code and he actually intended some improvements in 
the status of women. However, his tactic consisted at feeding a divisive 
debate that lasted for months. He finally retook the dossier as a mediator 
between inmobilists within his same Presidential alliance and abolitionists, to 
present a new proposal of more moderate changes. They slightly bettered 
marriage, divorce and guardianship and left untouched other issues such as 
obedience or inheritance. 
External actors who had been at the origin of pressures not only in 
Algeria but also in Morocco, were skilfully put in a situation to acknowledge 
Buteflika's compromising efforts, attributing relative failure to conservative 
forces in society but not to the President lack of boldness. Spain's socialist 
government obviously insisted in the importance of women emancipation 
given current policies in Spain, but could not move an inch from the 
dominant European perspective marked by resignation.  
 
 
3rd EPISODE: THE CHARTER FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.  
Non interference or approval of impunity? 
 
Here we can speak of a frenchisation of European Union policies. 
Something that has been explained by Mélanie Morisse-Schilbach (2001). 
France and Algeria are constantly engaged in a game of declarations and 
counterdeclarations, whereby opinions expressed by the French political 
class are quickly responded by acre accusations of interference by their 
Algerian counterparts. Here the press plays indeed a role in amplifying the 
issue. Meanwhile, commercial, financial and diplomatic exchanges continue 
and develop in good health. Using pre-emptive action, Algerian legislators 
stated in the National Charter a shielding clause preventing Army officials or 
Estate agents to be accused of massacres by any printed or visual mean. 
Furthermore, the Charter warned foreign players not to interfere with this 
«national and sovereign process of reconciliation». This was clearly 
understood by France, and to a great extent the European Union. 
The European Commission personnel in Brussels charged of the 
Algerian dossier frankly admitted to us that the Commission did not support 
the content and consequences of the Charter, but that it was tied up by high 
political decisions (Axelle Nicaise, 2005). The European Council therefore 
limited itself to laconically applaud the participation and recall the 
importance of respecting human rights and pursuing security: 
“The EU welcomes the participation of the Algerian people in the 
national referendum on the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. 
The EU hopes that, based upon consultations with its people, Algeria will 
achieve lasting peace and reconciliation, based on the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, leading to a prosperous and secure society” (Declaration of 
EU's Presidency on behalf of the European Council, 13142/05 (Presse 259), 10 
October 2005, Brussels). 
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This balanced and weak declaration was later confirmed when the 
Charter's four (4) texts of application were approved in February 2006. Once 
again, the EU refrained from taking a strong position and only took great 
care at demanding Algiers a list of terrorists now released from prison and 
before their penal dossiers would be cleaned as a result of amnesty 
regulations. Criticisms coming from Algerian society as from International 
Human Rights organisations were overheard by sake of non-interference.  
   
 
DISCOURSE AND PRIORITIES IN SPANISH FOREIGN AND COOPERATION 
POLICY TOWARDS ALGERIA 
 
DISCOURSE : 
Spain's discourses and priorities towards Algeria present a strange 
mixture of elements and ideas, not always coherent and sometimes clearly 
contradictory. 
As a starting point, Spain considers the Maghreb a zone of priority 
action and this translates into more intense political relations and a special 
effort in cooperation to development. Most conceptual framework for 
relations with Mediterranean countries and Maghrebean states in particular 
come from the European Union and France's approaches. 
The European Union approach can be synthesized as one of high 
standardization and low political involvement (See Youngs, 2002, for 
example). Through a functional mindset, one can expect that socio-economic 
transformation and political «normalization» under European standards 
would produce democracy and development in other countries. A sort of 
indirect projection of successful European elements, homogenization, trade 
and political integration outside the Union. This quite anonymous and 
invisible diffusion would in time bring about the desire goals of modernity 
and prosperity. 
France's approach is substantially different. Despite a more democratic 
stand, since Mitterrand's La Baule Declaration in 1991, French foreign policy 
is still very much influenced by Charles de Gaulle «arab policy». Basically a 
policy of realism, («States are cool monsters», he once said), of equal 
recognition among States and non-interference in their internal affairs. This 
translated to the Arab world would mean a cooperative attitude with Arab 
nationalist regimes and regimes sympathetic to the non-aligned movement. 
This policy would obviously enhance France's aspirations of becoming a 
regional leader in the binary scenario of the Cold war. Under De Gaulle's 
ambitious politics, the Maghreb is a French «chasse gardé» (backyard) and 
Algeria the most important actor. This «French Arab policy» has eventually 
weakened but is still manifest in France reluctance to let other (European and 
not European) countries involve in Algeria at the same level or in competition 
with it. It is also visible in France's encouragement for the creation of UMA 
under president François Mitterrand and recent impulse to reactivate 
Dialogue 5+ 5 in the Western Mediterranean. 
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Only recently and gradually has France found useful the European 
perspective to the Mediterranean and decided to fully integrate and 
participate. It however keeps for itself other Fora sometimes divergent and 
contradictory such as the Mediterranean Forum or the Dialogue 5+5 (Schmid, 
2005). This forum allows France to work on them as a laboratory before 
making proposals in the EU for the entire Mediterranean region. It is also an 
area where France is dominant and feels still at ease (Schmid, 2005). 
Spain obviously incorporates its own elements in the design of foreign 
policy towards the Maghreb. This is obviously more clear in the case of 
Morocco where history and the territories of Ceuta y Melilla force Spain to 
develop defence capacities as well as imaginative ideas like the «safe 
mattress of interests». Spanish policy makers are also influenced by Spain's 
own recent history of relative success in achieving democracy and integration 
in Europe. Transition to democracy in Spain was in many ways natural and 
evolutionary, in the sense that Franco had to die before the whole process 
could start. No active action of mass resistance or foreign assistance was 
directed against Franco's regime1. Great socio-economic change during the 
1960s preceded the transition to democracy, making it easier to adapt to new 
conditions. 
Equally to France and the EU, Spain has given its support to reforms in 
the Maghreb. But for Spain, reforms are not really a goal in themselves but a 
means to achieve «stability and prosperity» and that «not only because of 
Spain's own interest but also because of solidarity with the Maghreb peoples» 
(Política exterior de España en Africa del Norte, Principios y Objetivos, 
Official MAE's Website, 2006). Reforms are thought to bring socio-economic 
development and political modernization. They are supposedly being carried 
through political dialogue. Dialogue, among equals, channelled through 
institutions and networks is thought to spread democratic values in southern 
countries through a socialization process just as the Helsinki process did in 
Easter Europe (Youngs, 2002). This has also been called a process of osmosis 
(Youngs, 2005), as if it was an involuntary process of exchange and 
communication. 
Now, support for reform is not an absolute goal but a relative one, 
relative to the underlining goals (stability and prosperity) and to 
time requirements: 
«Spain backs the gradual advances in the field of institutional reform 
and the issues of human rights (women condition, freedom of press, etc.). 
The countries of North Africa can become the leaders in the process of 
reforms in the Mediterranean region and in the rest of the Arab world». 
(Política exterior de España en Africa del Norte, Principios y Objetivos, 
Official MAE's Website, 2006). 
In the first edition of the Javea Forum on Neighbourhood, on May 
2006, sponsored by the EU and presided over by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
Spanish Foreign Ministry Miguel Angel Moratinos pointed to several threats 
to stability, the partnership and reforms. Among the former, he mentioned 
                                                          
1 Although all Spanish political parties received substantial aid (the famous «maletines») from foreign political 
organizations, especially during the transition. 
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terrorism, resentment, political Islam and illegal migration. Among the latter, 
he indicated some consequences of globalization and «re-bilateralisation» of 
relations. Finally, he saw security measures taken against terrorism as a 
threat to political and economic reforms. Therefore, Moratinos called to 
«concentrate actions on the most vulnerable sectors but also on the activities 
with greatest potential of real impact in already launched reforms of political 
and economic nature». 
However, there are main contradictions in this discourse that Spanish 
policy makers seem not to be aware of. First, the link between economic 
liberalisation and democratisation is far from obvious. Second, economic 
liberalisation in the Barcelona process seems to be cut off from socio-ecomic 
and cultural rights, preventing the benefits of growth to spread and be 
redistributed (see a special issue of Mediterranean Politics, vol 9, n.3, 2004). 
Connected to this is the fact that the social cost and sustainability threshold 
of economic liberalisation has also been overlooked (I. Martin, 2005). 
Third, Spain presupposes that lack of democracy is due to traditional 
institutions in need of modernization. Modernization should according to 
European Union's bureaucratic jargon be accomplished through «institutional 
capacity building». However, since the «bureaucratic state model» (O'Donnell, 
Huntington et al.) was predicated in Latin America and Asia in the 1970s with 
terrible consequences, modernization theories applied to politics were 
abandoned by both academics and experts. In fact, many institutions in 
authoritarian countries today can be said to be modern, such as Armies or 
economic sectors linked to the world economy (primary products and energy, 
for example). This partial but intensive modernization is perfectly 
compatible with authoritarian behaviour. 
Fourth, and probably more serious, the conditioning trap of stability 
taken as fundamental goal may underpin any effort to support reforms. 
Moreover, reforms may take many different forms or even be emptied of 
content or decided without people's participation. If reforms are taken 
vacuously and no time-frame is fixed, substantial change may even have to 
wait for ever. This is the danger of uncritically supporting «reforms». 
 
 
PRIORITIES IN THE SPANISH POLICY OF COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
Spain's official development aid to Algeria was a very modest 
contribution in absolute terms with some high peaks due to FAD credits in 
2005 and 2006. Left apart aid to Western Sahara population in Algeria's 
Tinduf, total aid to Algeria between 2000 and 2002 was lower to that of 
Tunisia (2.0 M€ every year compared to 3.0 M€ for Tunisia. 
Spanish ODA to Algeria was marked by very high bilateral assistance 
(66%, highest for all Arab Mediterranean partners), low multilateral and NGO 
project assistance. 
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Spain's sell of transport airplanes to Algeria in 2005, made this country 
the first customer of Spanish weapons in 2005. This also risks provoking a 
weapon race with Morocco.  
 
 
FIGURE 1: PRIORITY SECTORS OF THE  
SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI) IN ALGERIA 
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Source: MAE, Documento estragégico. PAIS-ARGELIA, 2006 
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Interpretation:  
Although Strategic objective nº 1 receives in principle the highest 
priority, (score 1), two of the four lines involving democracy and rule of law 
get little attention (score 3). Worse, these strategic lines are at the core of 
democratic assistance and governance promotion. Other strategic lines, more 
tangential, such as civil society and public management get more attention 
but the prefered and almost only tool is “training”. Finally, Strategic objective 
nº 5, dealing with freedom and culture gets scarce attention (scores 3-4).  
   
 
4. Despite a considerable potential, disregarded opportunities 
ALGERIA'S CURRENT SITUATION AND POTENTIAL FOR GOOD 
GOVERNANCE  
 
FIGURE II: SOME HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN ALGERIA  
 
Some IMPORTANT  
problems with human rights in Algeria:  
*Death Penalty not abolished  
*Prison sentence for press defamation  
*Restricted religious freedom  
*Trade Union liberties attacked  
*Violence against women  
*Impunity of state and armed groups crimes  
*No ratification of International Penal Court Statute
 
 
GOVERNANCE: 
• Is a normative figure. A concept with an ideological agenda behind.  
• But susceptible of reinterpretation. Much debate on its meaning and 
content: Democratic or non-democratic governance (result), participative or 
technocratic governance (who decides what is to be measured and how, 
different indicators), who is evaluating and where is the reference (peer 
review or hierarchical evaluation)  
• Offering considerable potential. It is a subtle tool (more than democracy), 
especially suited for non-state actors.  
• It includes valid dimensions such as accountability, rule of law, 
decentralisation, corruption, absence of violence, human rights and civil 
society. As well as quality of public services and market-friendly regulations.  
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FIGURE III: ALGERIA'S PROGRESS IN GOVERNANCE (WB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretation:  
Algeria has substantially improved its governance score going from the 
lowest 25 percentile rank in 1998 to the next 25-50 percentile rank in 2004. 
Nevertheless it is still far from an score over 50 (26th rank), and also behind 
Morocco (same percentile rank, but 47th rank) and Tunisia's (next percentile 
rank, 50-75, 51th rank) performances, according to the World Bank (WB). 
Therefore there is a large margin for Algeria's improvement in governance 
and rule of law. Note : Horizontal segments indicate the margin of error. 
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MAP I: GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD (WORLD BANK)  
 
 
 
 
Source : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/worldmap.asp#map
 
 
   
FOREIGN DEMOCRATIC/GOVERNANCE AID FOR ALGERIA. 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS 
 
FIGURE IV: PLANNED DISBURSEMENTS OF COOPERATION AID  
TO ALGERIA (M€) INCLUDING GRANTS AND LOANS 
 
 
   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
Average per
year  
EU  50  43  55  60  45  50M€  
FRANCE    110  148      129M€  
SPAIN  2.0  2.2  4.0  5.0  11  4.4M€  
 
Sources: Own elaboration from European Commission, OECD/CAD and MAE sources 
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FIGURE V: ESTIMATED PART OF DEMOCRATIC/GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE TO  
ALGERIA IN MAIN DONOR'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID 
 
 
Financing Actor and 
Tool 
Average percentage 
(2001-2005) 
EU (EIDHR + MEDA 
related programmes) 
EIDHR 5.5M€+ MEDA 
35M€/345.8M€= 
12 % max. 
FRANCE  
(democratic 
assistance)
0.3% 
SPAIN 
(Governance sector 
and women 
empowerment sector)
6-10% max. 
 
Sources: Own elaboration from EU (2005), EC Delegation in Algiers (2005),  
Daguzan (2002) and MAE (2005) sources. 
 
 
Interpretation:  
France is obviously the main single donor of cooperation aid to Algeria, 
very far from Spain and about three times more important than the EU. 
France, being the most generous donor does however not translate into a 
proportional share for good governance or democratic assistance. On the 
contrary, France was only dedicating 0.3% to democratic promotion 
(estimation using strict terms), whereas the EU including its human rights 
line and MEDA funds and Spain on the other side, did sensibly better 
(estimation using loose terms).  
 
 
QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE 
ASSISTANCE  
EU. Excessive use of macro-projects (N-E and N-W rural areas touched 
by terrorism, little control. Selection of non-problematic civil society, fear to 
disrupt France's policies in the country. 
FRANCE. National interest oriented policies, «real politik». Preference 
for state to state technical assistance («jumelage institutionnel»), supervision 
of French NGOs and narrow cooperation with the government. 
SPAIN. Preference also for state to state direct aid (88%, the highest of 
all Arab Mediterranean partners). Excessive fear to intervene. When faced to 
programming and financing cooperation in Algeria, Spain clearly prefers 
technical assistance to governance promotion. Even when Algeria stated its 
will to receive assistance for governance (see figure VI), Spain deemed that it 
was not a priority line (1-to 4 scale, 1 being the highest) (see figure I). 
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Little coordination between MAE, other Ministries and AECI (Spanish 
Cooperation Agency), on one hand and between those and other Spanish 
actors, on the other.  
 
 
POSSIBILITIES FOR SPAIN:  
ALGERIAN ATTITUDE, TARGET SECTORS AND ACCUMULATED 
EXPERIENCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROMOTION ALGERIAN ATTITUDE  
 
FIGURE VI : ALGERIAN ATTITUDE TO GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE 
 
Problemas 
Identificados 
Voluntad 
Gobierno Argelino
Capacidad 
España 
Poca diversificacion 
economica 
si Si 
Revueltas en Cabilia no No 
Inseguridad Nacional si No 
Mal gobierno si Si 
Igualdad Mujer si Si 
Medio ambiente si Si 
Débil tejido social no si 
Formacion ocupacional si Si 
 
Source: MAE, Documento estragégico. PAIS-ARGELIA, 2006 
 
The identification of wills and capacities done by the Spanish 
Cooperation Agency in Algeria shows both a positive attitude from the 
Algerian government to be assisted in the domain of «bad governance» (mal 
gobierno) and effective Spanish capacity to carry out this task. However, as 
we have seen before, governance related programmes receive a marginal 
priority in the programming and financing guidelines of Spanish cooperation 
(see figure I). 
The existence of Algerian political will to engage in governance 
promotion is also confirmed by the G-8 Memorandum on Reforms, the 
sponsoring and early participation in NEPAD's African Peer Review 
Mechanism and the inclusion of the topic in the direct bilateral meetings 
between Spain and Algeria («Comisión Mixta»).  
 
TARGET SECTORS 
Existing EU's programs related to governance and listed in the EU's 
National Indicatif Program for Algeria (2005-2006) are: support for ONGDs 
(NGOs for Development), scientific and other police corps training, justice 
reform, support to Algerian journalists and media (not yet on) and public 
sector modernisation and reform (on watch). 
There are numerous potential sectors for Spanish intervention. As 
identified in an AECI internal document coordinated by this author, the 
following sectors could easily bear fruit if adequately exploited : 
Parliamentary cooperation (an accord being in force between both national 
parliaments), Political parties (following the work done by NDI but extending 
REIM – Nº 1 – Enero 2007 77
Rafael Bustos 
it to found a Spanish think tank based in Algeria), trade unions (building on 
Friedrich Ebert's work), journalists (despite prevailing difficulties), lawyers 
(after US Bar Association), defence sector reform and accountability (little 
explored but enormously important), gender-related violence (profiting from 
Spanish experience), financial transparency (especially of hydrocarbons 
surplus revenues), local administration and decentralization and finally, 
university cooperation (drawing on regional agreements such as one 
concluded between the University Network Institut Joan Luis Vives and the 
Universités de l'Ouest de l'Algérie, currently on implementation). In the field 
of education and research, a Spanish branch of CSIC to cover the whole 
Maghreb area could be a worth trying investment, especially given the 
absence of such a French institution in Algeria and its unlikely installation. 
 
EXPERIENCE 
Other countries in Algeria. As mentioned before, some aspects of USA, 
France, Germany, Italy and Belgium's cooperation could be worthy observing. 
The experience of PNUD and the European Commission is also interesting. 
France mainly bilateral and ministerial cooperation could be counterbalanced 
with a more indirect non-state actors cooperation such as the one German 
and American institutions (foundations, NGOs, Lawyers associations) are 
carrying out. Cooperation in social and emergency aid domains is rather 
Italian and Belgium's speciality (as well as France) whereas complex inter-
ministerial programmes have been so far carried out by PNUD and the 
European Commission. 
Spain could exploit a growing and rich experience from cooperation 
outside Algeria, especially in Latino America, the Balkans and Morocco. 
Political parties' foundations such as PSOE's Fundación Pablo Iglesias is very 
active in democracy promotion in Latino America. It organises for example 
seminars and training activities on leadership development in countries like 
Peru and Venezuela and on democratic governance (gobernabilidad) in Chile, 
Uruguay and Paraguay (see www.fpabloiglesias.org ). The experience in the 
Balkans although of limited interest because of its state-building nature, can 
nevertheless be the source of useful lessons, especially on the post-conflict 
problems that Algerian and Balcanic countries are facing alike. Finally, 
governance cooperation with Morocco is still very modest but certainly more 
advanced than in Algeria and may yield also very appropriate 
understandings. 
  
 
Conclusion: an alternative explanation to the obvious «simply gas» 
answer. Three interactive factors behind inertia and conservatism 
 
However important hydrocarbons (notably gas) may be in Spain-
Algerian relations, it is not the only reason to explain Spanish inertia and 
conservatism in foreign policy towards this part of the world. The case of 
Tunisia (of no hydrocarbon importance and marginal commercial interest) 
shows well that Spain's weak good governance promotion is not only due to 
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energy considerations. In Tunisia, Spanish leaders' blunt acceptance of 
Tunisia's regression into authoritarianism is totally independent of economic 
or strategic national interests. Therefore, something else must explain this 
obviously anomalous pattern of Spanish foreign policy. 
The three following factors behind inertia and conservatism should be 
analyzed and further researched: 
1. The inertia of pragmatism from Franco to Gonzalez in Spain's Arab policy 
towards the Maghreb  
2. Unreformed foreign service. Translated into insufficient human capacities, 
poor organisation and ambivalent values, masked behind the EU bureaucratic 
umbrella  
3. A Spanish copycat of France's foreign policy with this country, «second 
player in the region» complex and intellectual dependency in policy 
formulation 
We have found evidence and signs of these three factors affecting 
Spanish foreign policy in the region. A previous study as well as other 
authors work on Spanish foreign policy to the Maghreb during the Socialist 
period stresses the pragmatism of Spain's external actions (Bustos, 
1995/1996 and Larramendi and Nuñez, 1995). This may in turn be related to 
an only partial departure from Franco's Arab policy. 
The problem of an unreformed foreign service is multifold and has 
been evoqued in the PSOE's 2004 electoral program. In fact, the present 
government is engaged in advancing reform and modernisation of the 
Spanish Foreign Service. An interesting indicator may be that the actual 
number of foreign diplomats today is about the same as it was in 1975, when 
Spain had very small diplomatic needs to perform. Of course, this is not only, 
nor principally a problem of numbers but of qualification, recruitment, 
mentality and organisation. 
The limitations on foreign policy capacities produced by insufficient 
reform in the foreign service makes even more attractive to catch behind 
European policies. The progressive Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy 
can be seen as comfortable protection from the hazards of international 
relations. The European shields saves Spanish authorities the trouble of 
developing clear time-frame goals and taking a clear cut position in a 
particular crisis, fraudulent election or human rights violation. Consensual 
and therefore often ambivalent EU's statements on Algerian topics make 
clear foreign policy views of Spain or other countries totally dispensable. 
The problem of dependence and wagon-banding with France is also 
complex. It is both psychological and intellectual. It translates into foreign 
policy actions as well as in policy formulation. Over-caution when acting in 
Algeria is in part an effect of France's influence. At the same time, slow 
adoption of an otherwise potential and useful concept such as governance, 
can be linked to intellectual dependency from France and low innovation 
capacity in foreign policy design. A good illustration of this being the late 
and identical adoption in Spanish foreign policy discourse of the term 
«democratic governance» following French switch from «gouvernance» to 
«gouvernance démocratique». 
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To conclude, we may say that hydrocarbon is not the only reason for 
Spanish lazy governance promotion in Algeria and other Maghreb countries. 
Algeria does not mind governance assistance. There is also considerable 
margin for improving Algeria's governance and Spain could do much better 
were it not afraid of leaving the beaten path (beaten by France and the 
European Union). In order to do so, Spanish authorities need to integrate new 
concepts in policy formulation and assume a bolder position vis-a-vis France. 
In this sense, the normative but evolving concept of governance may offer a 
good opportunity if adequately developed.  
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